In a laboratory experiment subjects are matched in pairs and interact in an Ultimatum Game. In the Entitlement treatment, the right to be the proposer is allocated to the person in the pair who performed better in a previously conducted math task. Compared to behavior in the control treatment, where the roles are randomly allocated, the proposers increase their strategic demands and offer a smaller share of the pie to the responder in the Entitlement treatment. This result is driven entirely by female proposers; when earning their role, they significantly lower their offers, whereas male proposers do not behave differently than when roles are randomly allocated. This is in line with previous research suggesting that women are more sensitive to contextual factors and social cues, meaning that strengthening feelings of entitlement could be a way to decrease gender differences in negotiation behavior.
Introduction
To better understand the persistent gender gaps in society, especially in labor market outcomes, researchers are investigating negotiation behavior. Laboratory and field experiments document that women are both less willing to enter negotiations in the first place and that they bargain less aggressively than men when actively negotiating (e.g. . One possible reason that has been suggested for why this gender gap in negotiations is observed is that women may take less credit for their success (c.f. Deaux and Farris, 1977; Apicella et al., 2017) , and feel less entitled to higher pay than men (Major et al., 1984; Barron, 2003; Gelfand and Stayn, 2012 .; for a review, see Gelfand and Stayn, 2012) . If this is the case, one potentially fruitful way to encourage tougher behavior in negotiations by women would be to strengthen their feelings of entitlement.
However, manipulating feelings of entitlement for women only, without also making men feel more entitled, may be difficult in many real world settings. We investigate a way to get around this, using the experimental literature's finding that women are more sensitive to contextual factors and social cues than men (Croson and Gneezy, 2009 ) as a starting point. For example, the fact that subjects cooperate more when a Prisoners' Dilemma is labeled as a "Community Game" as opposed to a "Stock Market Game" has been shown to exclusively originate from women changing their behavior between the frames (Ellingsen et al., 2013) .
In our laboratory experiment, we use a design similar to Hoffman et al. (1994) to investigate the impact of increased feelings of entitlement on behavior in an Ultimatum Game (UG). We use two treatments: In the Entitlement treatment, proposers are chosen based on superior performance in a previously conducted task. In the Random treatment, 3 the roles of proposer and responder are randomly allocated in the pair. We replicate the result from Hoffman et al. (1994) that proposers, on average, are tougher in their strategic demands in the sense that they offer a smaller share to their matched responder in the Entitlement treatment. We further show that there are significant differences in how men and women react to earned entitlements, documenting that the average reaction to treatment is driven entirely by the female proposers.
1 When women earn the right to be the proposer in the UG, they respond by claiming a significantly larger share for themselves compared to the Random treatment, whereas male proposers do not change their behavior. In our setting, this implies that whereas there is no gender difference in offers in the Random treatment, women actually make tougher strategic demands than men in the Entitlement treatment.
Our work is related to several strands of literature. First, the research on gender differences in negotiation behavior is extensive (c.f. . The results from research studying gender differences in how proposers make strategic demands in the UG are mixed, with some documenting that women claim less for themselves and others finding that there is no gender difference (Eckel and Grossman, 2001; Solnick, 2001 ). Other experimental work frames the interactions as a (sometimes hypothetical, sometimes real) wage negotiation, resulting in more clear cut findings, with female subjects found to set lower goals, state lower minimum acceptable wages, and negotiate lower compensation than men (see e.g. Stevens et al., 1993; Kaman and Hartel, 1994; Dittrich et al., 2014 and Exley et al., 2017) . Moreover, the context of the negotiation matters:
providing information on others' negotiation decisions (Rigdon, 2012) and framing the negotiation as an ask rather than a negotiation (Small et al., 2007) both help to close the gender gap in negotiation.
Research using field data also point in the direction of women negotiating less often and less successfully. For example, document that recent female MBA graduates negotiate for their starting salaries significantly less often than their fellow male graduates. This contributes to the fact that women earn less than men, even when graduating from the same MBA program. Leibbrant and List (2014) show that women are more likely to signal to employers that they are willing to accept a lower wage than what is advertised and that the context matters: explicitly informing prospective employees about what is negotiable reduces the gender gap in willingness to negotiate.
The second strand of literature we build upon is the one aiming at understanding the effects of entitlements on behavior in not only the UG but also in other games, such as the Dictator Game (DG). Hoffman et al. (1994) was of the first to ask the question of how behavior differs between earned and randomly allocated endowments in the UG and DG.
Their findings, that proposers offer less of their endowment to the responder in the UG and to the receiver in the DG when they have earned the right to be the proposer, has been widely replicated and extended (e.g. Cherry, 2001; Cherry et al., 2002; Oxoby and Spraggon, 2008; Banerjee and Chakravarty, 2014; Korenok et al., 2017; see also Hoffman and Spitzer, 1985 , which partly foreruns the work in Hoffman et al., 1994) . To our knowledge however, the existing literature does not investigate gender differences. Thus we are the first to suggest, and find evidence for, the well-established finding of the effects of entitlements on proposer behavior in the UG may be driven by women.
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From here, the paper proceeds as follows. We start by describing the experimental design and implementation in Section 2. In Section 3, we conduct the analysis, document our main findings and discuss potential mechanisms. Section 4 concludes.
The Experiment

Experimental Design
The experiment consisted of three parts. In the first part, all participants completed an arithmetic task. 2 They had five minutes in which to provide the answers to a series of math tasks that consisted of adding up five two-digit numbers (c.f. Niederle and Vesterlund, 2007) . Participants were informed that they would receive $0.25 for each correct answer, that they would be paid at the end of the experiment, but that prior to the payout, no information about own performance would be given. Subjects never learned the details about others' performance.
Ahead of the second part of the experiment, participants were matched in pairs. Our experiment entailed two treatments. In the Random treatment, one of the participants in the pair was randomly given the right to be the proposer in the game that followed. In the Entitlement treatment, this right was awarded to the person in the pair who performed better in the math task in the first part (ties were broken randomly by the computer). In both treatments, participants were informed whether the proposer (neutrally labeled "Player A"
and described as the more advantageous position) and responder (labeled "Player B") roles were allocated randomly or based on performance.
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In order to ensure that the selected proposers and responders, respectively, were comparable in characteristics between the treatments, pairing was done in the following way. Immediately after the first part, subjects were ranked from highest to lowest according to their performance in the math task. The subject ranked first was then matched with the subject ranked second, the subject ranked third was matched with the subject ranked fourth, and so on. The subjects were told that they were matched anonymously to another person in the room; we took care to not claim that the match was random.
In the second part of the experiment, participants played a one-shot UG. The proposers offered a division of a total endowment of $20 between themselves and their matched responder. For the responders we used the strategy method, and they stated a minimum acceptable division of the pie, i.e. how large their share would have to be for them to accept the offer. They were informed that if the minimum acceptable offer was less than or equal to the actual offer made by the matched proposer, the money would be split as proposed and paid out at the end of the experiment. If the minimum acceptable offer exceeded the offer made, both participants in the pair would receive nothing.
The third part of the experiment consisted of a belief elicitation stage. Proposers were asked to predict the minimum acceptable offer that the matched responder had indicated, and similarly the responders were asked to state their beliefs about the offer that their matched proposer had actually given. Participants were also asked to predict the number of correct math tasks done both by themselves and by the other people in the room. For all belief elicitations, participants were informed that they would be rewarded based on the accuracy of their estimates and that a more accurate belief would yield a higher payoff (for details, see the instructions in the Online Appendix).
After the experiment was concluded, participants were informed about their payoffs. Before the earnings were privately paid out, participants completed a questionnaire collecting demographic information. We also asked questions regarding risk preferences, fairness views, and feelings of deservingness.
Design deviations from Hoffman et al. (1994)
As our objective is to test if the results presented in Hoffman et al. (1994) are driven by women's behavior, it is natural that our design closely reflect theirs. However, we consciously made a few deviations from their design. First, in order to be able to study gender differences we did not implement a double blind design, but did collect demographic information and matched it to the participants' behavior in the experiment.
Second, while Hoffman et al. use a general knowledge quiz in the first part of the experiment we use a math task. The reason is that we know from previous experiments that performance in this task tend to be gender neutral in this particular student population.
Third, Hoffman et al. implemented the quiz in part one only in their Entitlement treatment but not in their Random treatment. In order to increase comparability between treatments we chose to implement the math task in both treatments.
Fourth, we used the strategy method for the responders in that we asked them to report minimum acceptable offers as opposed to simply asking them to accept or reject the offer actually extended to them by their matched responder. We did this in order to collect richer information on responder behavior and to be able to elicit more precice beliefs from the proposers about the behavior of their matched respondents. The fact that we use the strategy method for the responders does not, however, impact how the instructions to the 8 proposers are put before they make their decision on offers, and hence our design remains comparable to that of Hoffman et al. regarding proposer behavior.
The final, and most important, difference between our design and Hoffman et al. is the pairing mechanism described above. We implemented this in order to ensure that the math ability (and characteristics potentially correlated with this), and earnings from part 1, are held as constant as possible between proposers and responders, respectively, in the two treatments. Hoffman et al. on the other hand also rank their participants according to ability, but give the proposer roles to the 50 percent of participants who performed better thereby increasing the likelihood that proposers differ more in performance compared to the responders in the Entitlement treatment than in the Random treatment.
Implementation
The instructions were provided immediately ahead of each part, both on participants' screens and read aloud by the experimenter, thus ensuring common knowledge.
Between the first and the second part, participants took part in a quiz to ensure that they had understood the instructions and procedures. Those (very few) participants who had problems answering the quiz were given a repetition of the instructions by the experi-
menter.
An even number of subjects participated in each of the ten experimental sessions.
No communication was allowed among participants and matching was done anonymously.
The experiment (programmed with z-Tree, Fischbacher, 2007) Participants earned an average of $18.40 (including a fixed show-up fee) for their participation in a session that lasted approximately 40 minutes. Although we recruited an equal number of men and women to each session, we had 66 women and 62 men participating; this small deviation from 50/50 is the result of a slight gender difference in showup rates. Gneezy, 2009; Gärtner et al., 2017 ; and something that we also replicate, with women scoring 6.12 and men 6.85 on a qualitative 1-10 willingness to take risk scale, p=0.033 with WMW test and p=0.073 with ttest), makes also controlling for risk aversion the most prudent option. It should be noted that the results reported here hold also when controlling only for one of these variables or for none of them (reported in the Online Appendix).
Results
Proposer Behavior
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further support for female and male proposers' reaction to the Entitlement treatment indeed being different. This also implies that, in the Random treatment, we replicate the finding from
Solnick (2001) 
Math Scores and Confidence
Female participants gave an average of 7.92 correct answers in part one of the experiment, whereas male participants gave 7.08 (p=0.120 with WMW test and p=0.083 with t-test).
There was no significant difference in performance between treatments (average score was 7.42 in the Random treatment and 7.61 in the Entitlement treatment, p=0.799 with WMW test and p=0.703 with t-test).
In order to investigate confidence, we use the belief measures from the third part of the experiment. We consider two types of confidence (cf. Moore and Healy, 2008) , with the first being overestimation, i.e. to what extent does a person believe that she performed better than she actually did in the math task. To measure this we take the difference between the score that the participant believed she achieved (as stated in the incentivized belief elicitation stage) and her actual score. The other type of confidence that we consider is over-placement, i.e. how a participant believes that her own score compares to others'. We measure this as the difference between the score that the participant believed she achieved and her belief about the average score of others participating in the same session.
We are interested in how confidence relate to proposers' behavior. with Wald test).
Fairness Considerations and Feelings of Deservingness
In We also asked participants to report feelings of deservingness. Specifically we used a 1 to 10 Likert scale asking proposers if they believe that they deserved to be the proposer
(1 was defined as not deserving this role at all and 10 as definitely deserving it). We document that both female and male proposers consider themselves more deserving in the Entitlement treatment than the in Random treatment (7.44 for females and 7.13 for males in the Random treatment, and 8.79 for females and 9.26 for males in the Entitlement treatment). The difference between the treatments is significant for both female and male proposers (p=0.067 and p=0.002 with WMW test, and p=0.063 and p=0.001 with Wald test, for women and men respectively). Responders were asked how deserving they regarded their matched proposer to be. The results are similar to what is observed for the proposers, see the Online Appendix.
Strategic Thinking
As discussed above, we find that female, but not male, proposers change their beliefs about the responders' minimum acceptable offers between our two treatments. Here we continue to investigate the relation between proposers' offers and their beliefs about the responders' behavior.
A payoff maximizing proposer holding the (on average correct) belief that their matched responder will not accept offers that are "too low" should make an offer based on This suggests that gender differences in negotiation behavior may be impacted by entitlements. While male proposers appear to behave strategically in the UG regardless of whether they earned the proposer role or not, women seem to do so only in the presence of entitlements. 
Concluding Remarks
In a one-shot UG, we find that female proposers, but not male, react to entitlements by making tougher strategic demands and offering a lower share of the endowment to their matched responder. Further only female proposers believe that responders have a lower threshold for accepting an offer in the Entitlement treatment. Women also become significantly more confident regarding their performance, and change their strategic behavior.
Our findings are in line with others documenting that women are more responsive to context and social cues. Moreover, they have implications for labor market behavior in that they indicate that strengthening both women's and men's feelings of entitlement (something that could potentially be accomplished for example through more transparent recruitment processes) can have a greater effect on women's bargaining, hence helping to close the gender negotiation gap. This is an experiment about decision making. You have already earned $5 for showing up on time. You may earn more depending on your decision and the decisions made by the other participants. You will be paid privately in cash when the experiment is over. The experiment is conducted anonymously and decisions you make will never be linked to your identity. There are several parts in the experiment and instructions will be given at the beginning of each part.
Appendix A: Robustness Checks and Additional Analysis
We will go through the instructions for part 1 now, so please follow.
__________________________________________________________________ Part 1 -Math Task
Random Treatment: We now begin with the first part of the experiment where you can earn money. In this part of the experiment you are asked to solve as many math problems as you can. You have five minutes available. In each problem, you will sum up five two-digit numbers. An example is: 27+18+89+50+17. In this case the correct answer is 201. For each correct answer, you will receive $0.25. At the end of the experiment, you will learn how many of your answers were correct and how much you earned. This will then be paid out in cash together with your other earnings.
In the second part of the experiment, you will be paired with an anonymous person. Each pair will consist of one player A and one player B. Being player A is more advantageous, and on average, player A can earn more money than player B.
Your roles in the second part of the experiment will be determined randomly. The computer will randomly pick player A and B in each pair.
At the end of the experiment, you will learn how many of your answers were correct and how much you earned. This will then be paid out in cash together with your other earnings.
Entitlement treatment: We now begin with the first part of the experiment where you can earn money. In this part of the experiment you are asked to solve as many math problems as you can. You have five minutes available. In each problem, you will sum up five two-digit numbers. An example is: 27+18+89+50+17. In this case the correct answer is 201. For each correct answer, you will receive $0.25. In addition to that, your scores in the math task will determine the roles you will have in the second part of the experiment.
The number of correct answers you give in the first part will determine your roles in the second part of the experiment. The person who solves most math problems correctly in each pair will earn the right to be player A.
At the end of the experiment, you will learn how many of your answers were correct and how much you earned. This will then be paid out in cash together with your other earnings. ___________________________________________________________________ Quiz about part 1
We will now make sure that everyone has understood the instructions for part 1. Please answer the questions on the screen. If you need help, please raise your hand. When you have finished answering, please press "I understand". If any of your answers are incorrect, the program will tell you so and you get to answer that question again. Random Treatment: It has now been determined how many of your answers were correct. At the end of the experiment, you will learn how many correct answers you gave and the money you earned will be given to you in cash. We now move on to part 2 of the experiment where you can earn more money.
Entitlement Treatment: It has now been determined how many of your answers were correct and who in the pair earned the right to be player A. At the end of the experiment, you will learn how many correct answers you gave and the money you earned will be given to you in cash. We now move on to part 2 of the experiment where you can earn more money. _____________________________________________________________________ Part 2-Ultimatum Game Random treatment: In this part, you are paired with an anonymous person in this room. You will not be told who that person is either during or after the experiment, and s/he will not be told who you are. Each pair consists of one player A and one player B. We will tell you whether you are player A or player B after we have gone over the instructions.
Entitlement treatment:
In this part, you are paired with an anonymous person in this room. You will not be told who that person is either during or after the experiment, and s/he will not be told who you are. Each pair consists of one player A and one player B. We will tell you whether you have earned the right to be player A or not after we have gone over the instructions.
The experiment is conducted as follows: a sum of $20 will be given to player A in each pair. Player A will then suggest how much of the $20 that s/he should keep and how much of the $20 should be given to player B. Player B will then decide whether to accept or reject this suggestion. If player B accepts, the $20 will be divided as player A suggested. If player B rejects, both players will receive nothing.
Random treatment: Who in the pair ended up being player A or B is randomly determined by the computer. So each person in a pair has an equal chance of being selected as player A or player B. You will soon learn if you have been picked randomly as player A or not.
Entitlement treatment: Who in the pair ended up being player A or B is determined by your scores from the task you completed in part 1. The participant who solved more math problems correctly in your pair earned the right to be player A. In case of a tie, the computer randomly selected player A or player B. You will soon learn if you have earned the right to be player A or not. If you solved more math problems than the other person in your pair, you have earned the right to be player A. If not, you will play the game as player B.
THE GAME Once the roles are announced, you will play the game. First, player A will make a suggestion about how to divide the $20 between player A and player B. Then player B will decide if s/he is accepting or rejecting this suggestion. If player B accepts, player A and player B get the amounts player A suggested. If player B rejects, both players get nothing.
Let's look at two examples:
Random treatment: Example 1: Imagine that you are randomly selected to be player A and are given $20 to divide between yourself and player B. You suggest to give $6 to player B. Thus you want to keep $14 for yourself (20-6=14) . Suppose player B has decided to accept any suggestion that gives her/him more than $5. Therefore player B accepts this offer and the $20 is split as you suggested. That is, you receive $14 and player B receives $6 from this game.
Entitlement treatment: Example 1: Imagine that you have earned the right to be player A and are given $20 to divide between yourself and player B. You suggest to give $6 to player B. Thus you want to keep $14 for yourself (20-6=14) . Suppose player B has decided to accept any suggestions that gives her/him more than $5. Therefore player B accepts this offer and the $20 is split as you suggested. That is, you receive $14 and player B receives $6 from this game.
